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1CONSPICUOUS LOGIC:  USING THE LOGICAL FALLACY OF 
AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT AS A LITIGATION TOOL 
Stephen M. Rice!
I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation is complicated.   However, success or failure in litigation typically 
turns on the simplest questions.  Legal analysis is complicated.  However, answers 
to legal questions, also typically turn on answers to simple questions.  Below the 
manifold and dynamic complexities of rules of law, standards of review, and per-
suasiveness of evidence, lay simple questions that ultimately determine the answer 
to legal questions with a “yes” or “no.”  These basic, fundamental structures of 
legal argument can make up a complex legal theory’s form.   While these ultimate 
questions may be simple, sifting through the rhetoric of legal argument may be 
difficult.  However, a convention of philosophy, the formal logical fallacy, can be a 
useful tool for litigators and jurists interested in ensuring the logical integrity of 
legal argument.  One formal logical fallacy, the Fallacy of Affirming the Conse-
quent, is a practical tool for legal thinkers to use to identify patterns of legal argu-
ment that are unsound, to reveal the simple questions in legal argument, and an-
swer those questions conclusively. 
The importance of finding the fundamental components in legal argument is 
best illustrated by example.  A lawyer was standing in a courtroom prepared to 
make an argument in support of my motion for summary judgment.  She was pre-
pared for the hearing, but was not prepared for the judge to begin the proceeding by 
asking, “Counsel, do you agree to X?  If you do, I’m inclined to grant your mo-
tion.”  Her first instinct was to immediately respond with the word “yes.”  It 
seemed to be too simple a response to secure her intended result.  Was the question 
one the judge thought she would never concede?  She wondered if the judge was 
setting her up.  Was this a serious question, or was it merely rhetorical?  She was 
before a learned, thoughtful judge.  The judge was not one inclined to ask a ques-
tion out of sarcasm, and was known for his willingness to give litigants a fair 
chance to make their arguments.  Thinking on her feet as litigators often do, she 
gave as much thought to these issues as she could in the five seconds it took to 
respond.  The response was based on what she might, at first blush, attribute to a 
gut reaction. “Yes, your honor.  My client’s position is indeed, X.  Thank you your 
honor.”
What happened next was contrary to whatever instinct of reason led her to an-
swer the court’s question with a “yes.”  The judge turned to opposing counsel and 
 ________________________  
! Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law.  B.A. 1992, Michigan State University; 
J.D. 1995, Thomas M. Cooley Law School. 
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asked him to present his argument.  By the time opposing counsel was finished, it 
was clear that the court had either lost sight of its initial question, or did not mean 
to ask it.  Opposing counsel was able to convince the court of the existence of 
enough of a genuine issue of material fact that summary judgment was precluded, 
and therefore the moving party was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  
Had the court not framed the arguments with its original question to her, the result 
might not have seemed so unsettling to her.  However, after the court asked that 
question, there seemed to be no need to hear from opposing counsel at all.  There 
certainly was no need to allow him to stir that big pot of clear water that the court 
had placed upon the stove, and proceed to fill it with bits of carrot, celery and pota-
toes.  Nonetheless, by the time opposing counsel was finished, he had transformed 
this pot of clear, cold water into thick, hot soup.  He had prepared a thick stew, 
filled with aromatic, irresistible chunks of “genuine issues of material fact.”
How often does that happen in the courtroom?  How frequently are the tasks of 
two lawyers more like the tasks of two chefs?  One chef sets out to take simple, 
unadulterated ingredients and stew them into a complex mix.  His task is to create 
an abundance of sights, sounds, and smells, all designed to distract his customers 
from knowing how simple and easy it is to appreciate the mix’s ingredients.  As a 
result, the customers will instead marvel at the pleasing, novel flavor, sophistica-
tion and complexity of the cuisine.  The other chef has quite another task.  His is to 
take a mixture of liquid ingredients, “reduce” them over the flame by harnessing 
the power of evaporation to remove the liquid, and leave behind a less complex, 
simple.   
Lawyers frequently overlook or ignore the fact that complex legal arguments 
can be reduced into their most basic fundamental structures.  Moreover, our task as 
litigators is often to find arguments’ most basic, simple structures and draw the 
court’s attention to them.  Unfortunately, lawyers are frequently untrained in iden-
tifying these simple structures.  We have a “sense” for what they are, but cannot 
always identify them.  We are not armed with the language necessary to describe 
them.  We are not always comfortable explaining them, or why they are so compel-
ling to others.     
However, there is a simple, time-tested, solution to providing these explana-
tions.  These most basic argumentative structures are functions of the ancient rules 
of philosophical logic.  These are rules that philosophy has been refining for centu-
ries.  They are simple.  They are easy to explain. They are as basic as an argumen-
tative structure can get.  Importantly for lawyers, they frequently can be proved to 
be the basic ingredients of a legal argument.  On that day in the courtroom, they 
were exactly what that lawyer needed to convince the court that, in light of its first 
question, there was no need to hear opposing counsel’s argument, much less be 
convinced by it.  As a matter of logic, if the court’s premise was correct, the lawyer
had to win her argument.  She could not lose.  The difference between her victory 
and defeat that day, was opposing counsel’s ability to complicate the otherwise 
simple argument, and steer the court away from the basic skeleton of logic toward 
something more complex and difficult to say “no” to. 
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The rules of logic, developed by philosophers for centuries, 1 made the moving 
lawyer’s position inescapable.  Philosophical logic would reduce the argument to 
its basic structure; a structure that philosophers would call a syllogism.  The argu-
ment, in its syllogistic form, provides: 
1. If defendant’s counsel’s answer to my question is “yes”, defen-
dant must win. 
2. Defendant’s counsel’s answer to my question is “yes”.
3. Therefore, defendant must win. 
This simple argumentative form is repeated daily in courtrooms across the 
United States.   However, those repeating, hearing, and reading these arguments do 
not understand the reasons why the arguments are so compelling.  The reasons 
have been tested and verified by hundreds of years of philosophical scrutiny.  They 
have been proved by rules of logic.  Those simple logical rules, once applied to the 
syllogistic structure, verify that the argument either has a logically sound, reliable 
structure, or that it does not.  Moreover, philosophic logic has used these rules to 
identify common patterns of argument that violate these fundamental rules, making 
the argument therefore inherently unsound and necessarily unreliable.  These pat-
terns of unreliable argument are called logical fallacies.  Understanding and identi-
fying these patterns allow lawyers to spot flawed logic and provide effective expla-
nations for why courts must reject them.  
This article, part of a series discussing the application of specific logical falla-
cies in legal argument,2 will address one of these fallacies, known as the Fallacy of 
Affirming the Consequent, discuss the place of formal logic in legal reasoning, 
describe the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent, demonstrate how courts have 
explicitly used the fallacy in deciding cases, and detail how litigators can use the 
Fallacy to win cases. 
II. WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC AND 
LOGICAL FALLACY
A. Understanding Deductive Logic and its Place in Legal Reasoning 
Identifying legal arguments that have logically fallacious form, requires some 
understanding of the logical context within which legal reasoning operates.  The 
language of philosophical logic provides a metalanguage for understanding and 
articulating what is right and what is wrong with a particular legal argument.  Legal 
 ________________________  
 1. C.L. HAMBLIN, FALLACIES 196 (1970) “Rules of validity for syllogisms stated in terms of Distribution 
have been a regular feature of Logic text books since the seventeenth century.”
 2. Stephen M. Rice, Indispensable Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle as a 
Litigation Tool 43 AKRON L. REV. 79 (2009); Stephen M. Rice, Conventional Logic:  Using the Logical Fallacy of 
Denying the Antecedent as a Litigation Tool, 79 MISS. L.J.  __(forthcoming 2010). 
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arguments take different forms.  One form of legal argument is logically deductive 
argument.  Deductive argument is argument that reasons from general principles to 
a specific conclusion.3   Deductive argument claims that the argument’s conclusion 
is required by the truth of its premises.4   That is, a logically deductive argument is 
one where the premises, if true, ensure that the conclusion must be true. 5  Legal 
argument does not always take the form of logically deductive logic.  Sometimes, 
for example, legal argument takes the form of logically inductive argument.  Ar-
guments based on inductive reasoning do not ensure the truth of their conclusion.6
Inductive logic reasons from specific to the general.7  Induction makes the claim 
that the conclusion is merely probable, not conclusive, in light of the truth of its 
premises.8  Lawyers regularly make inductive arguments but claim that their argu-
ments necessarily compel a particular conclusion.  It is important to recognize that 
lawyers frequently make inductive arguments that, either explicitly or impliedly, 
claim that their conclusion is required by the truth of the argument’s premises.  In 
fact, logic teaches us that such arguments, while they might be very persuasive, are 
not so compelling.9
Deductive logic focuses on the logical form of the argument.  In particular, de-
ductive logic focuses on the propriety of inferences based on the form of the argu-
ment.10  Where the form of a deductive argument is valid,11 the truth of the premis-
 ________________________  
 3. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 49 (Nat’l Inst. for 
Trial Advoc. 1997) (“In the law deductive reasoning moves from the general (universal) to the particular.”)
 4. See also IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 482 (13th ed., Prentice Hall 2008) 
(“[A]ny deductive argument, if it is good, brings to light in its conclusion what was already buried in its premises.  
The relation between premises and conclusion, in deduction, is one of logical necessity.  In every deductive argu-
ment, if it is valid and if its premises are true, its conclusion must be true.)  
 5. Id. at 26.   
 6. Id. at 482 (“In inductive arguments . . . the relations between premises and conclusion are not those of 
logical necessity.  The claim of certainty is not made.  The terms valid and invalid simply do not apply.  This does 
not mean that inductive arguments are always weak; sometimes they are very strong indeed, and fully deserve our 
confidence.) 
 7. ALDISERT, supra note 3, at 49 (“In the law of inductive reasoning moves: -- from the particular to the 
general (universal) (induced generalization  by enumeration of instances), or – from the particular to the particular 
(analogy)”).
 8. Id.   
 9. Id. at 47 (“In legal logic, [inductive logic] is often used to fashion either the major or the minor premise 
of the deductive syllogism.  Often, a statute or specific constitutional provision unquestionably qualifies as the 
controlling major premise.  It is the law of the case, with which the facts (minor premise) will be compared, so as 
to reach a decision (conclusion)”).
 10. JENS S. ALLWOOD ET AL., LOGIC IN LINGUISTICS 16 (Cambridge University Press 1977) (“One of the 
most important aspects of logic is the study of valid inference and sentences that are necessarily true.  There are 
two main types of inference:  those that are necessarily valid and those that are valid only with greater or lesser 
degree of probability.  Each type of inference is correlated with a special type of logical study.  The study of 
necessarily valid inferences is pursued within deductive logic, while inferences that are valid with some degree of 
probability are studied within inductive logic.”  
 11. COPI & COHEN, supra note 4, at 26 (“When the claim is made that the premises of an argument (if true) 
provide incontrovertible grounds for the truth of its conclusion, that claim will be either correct or not correct.  If it 
is correct, that argument is valid.  If it is not correct (that is, if the premises when true fail to establish the conclu-
sion irrefutably although claiming to do so), that argument is invalid.  For logicians the term validity is applicable 
only to deductive arguments.  To say that a deductive argument is valid is to say that it is not possible for its con-
clusion to be false if its premise are true.  Thus we define validity as follows:  A deductive argument is valid
when, if its premises are true, its conclusion must be true.  In everyday speech, of course, the term valid is used 
much more loosely.”) (emphasis in original).
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es necessarily requires the truth of the conclusion.  For a lawyer, this means if your 
logical structure is valid, and your facts are true, then the rules of logic require that 
you win your argument.  Alternatively, where the form of a deductive argument is 
invalid, the truth of the conclusion is not required by the truth of the premises.12
For a lawyer, this means if your facts are true, but your logical structure is invalid, 
then the rules of logic require that you lose your argument.  The focus of deductive 
logic is on identifying the form of an argument, and using simple rules of logic to 
ascertain whether the form is a recognized, valid form that requires the argument’s 
conclusion to be necessarily true.   
Understanding all of the rules of philosophic logic is an enormous task. It is 
simply not practical for a busy litigator to be expected to dig into the long history 
of philosophical logic, its debates, and evolution, and expect them to master, much 
less explain to a client, judge or jury, the nuances of formal deductive logic.  For-
tunately, such efforts are not necessary.  Philosophy has developed a catalog of 
argument structures that can be easily identified by their argumentative patterns.  
These patterns are hallmarks of arguments that violate the rules of logic.  The pat-
terns are called logical fallacies.  They offer a lawyer a shortcut through mastering 
philosophic logic by identifying the patterns of argument.  Recognizing these pat-
terns and describing what is fallacious about them, requires an understanding of the 
most common argumentative forums, and some of the terminology necessary to 
describe them.  Such an understanding begins with deductive argument’s basic 
form: the syllogism.  
B. The Syllogism:  The Building Blocks of Deductive Legal Argument 
The syllogism has been described as the most rigorous and persuasive13 argu-
mentative structure.  A syllogism is made up of two distinct but related premises 
and a conclusion.14  We tend to be naturally inclined to organize arguments in a 
syllogism.15  However, the syllogistic form is not always immediately apparent.  
Sometimes, effort is required to reveal the syllogistic form from ordinary argu-
ment.16  However, once identified, syllogisms take on common patterns, exempli-
fied repeatedly in legal advocacy. 
 ________________________  
 12. Id.
 13. Justice Antonin Scalia & Brian Garner, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 41
(2008).  Justice Antonin Scalia and Mark Garder, in their recent book suggest that lawyers “think syllogistically” 
and observe that “[t]he most rigorous form of logic and hence the most persuasive is the syllogism.”  Id.
 14. COPI & COHEN, supra note 4, at 224. 
 15. Id. at 41 (“Persuasion is possible only because all human beings are born with a capacity for logical 
thought.  It is something we all have in common. . . . If you have never studied logic, you may be surprised to 
learn – like the man who was astounded to discover that he had been speaking prose all his life – that you have 
been using syllogistic reasoning all along.”).  
 16. Id. at 267. (“In ordinary discourse the argument we encounter rarely appear as neatly packaged, stan-
dard-form categorical syllogisms.  So the syllogistic arguments that arise in everyday speech cannot always be 
readily tested.  They can be tested, however, if we put them into standard form – and we can generally do that by 
reformulating their constituent propositions.  The terms syllogistic argument refers to any argument that either is a 
standard-form categorical syllogism or that can be reformulated as a standard-form categorical syllogism without 
any loss or change of meaning.). 
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One common form of syllogism is the hypothetical syllogism.17  The hypothet-
ical syllogism contains “one or more compound, hypothetical (or conditional) 
propositions, affirming that if one of its components (the antecedent) is true then 
the other of its components (the consequent) is true.”18   Legal arguments frequent-
ly take the form of hypothetical syllogisms.19  The most commonly encountered 
form of hypothetical syllogism is the mixed hypothetical syllogism:  “a syllogism 
that has one conditional premise and one categorical premise.”20   For example: 
1. If assent to enter into a contract is made because of an impro-
per threat that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, then the 
contract is voidable by the victim.21
2. Assent to the contract was made because of an improper threat. 
3. Therefore, the contract is voidable by the victim.22
Within the class of hypothetical syllogisms, we find the Fallacy of Affirming 
the Consequent. The Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent takes a similar, but logi-
cally different, form from that of a well-formed hypothetical syllogism.  For exam-
ple: 
 ________________________  
 17. The examples of hypothetical syllogisms found in this article are actually “mixed hypothetical syllog-
isms,” a subset of hypothetical syllogisms.  A mixed hypothetical syllogism is made up of a conditional premise 
(an “if  . . . then” proposition) and a categorical premise (a proposition that puts its subject into a category).  In 
contrast, a “pure hypothetical syllogism” is comprised of two conditional propositions.  As legal arguments fre-
quently fall within the category of mixed hypothetical, and for purposes of consistency, this article will refer to 
mixed hypothetical syllogisms generically as hypothetical syllogisms. Of course there are other types of syllog-
isms. One common syllogism used in legal argumentation is a categorical syllogism, where the argument is based 
on the relationship between the concepts in the premises and the concepts’ membership in certain categories.  
Another type of common syllogism is the disjunctive syllogism.  The disjunctive syllogism “contains a compound, 
disjunctive (or alternative) premise asserting the truth of at least one of two alternatives, and a premise that asserts 
the falsity of one of those alternatives.” (emphasis in original)  Id. at 301. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Iams v. DiamlerChryslerCorp., 883 N.E.2d 466, 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Edwards v River-
dale School District, 188 P.3d 317 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc. 634 F.2d 690, 703 
(2d. Cir. 1980);  Zinpro Corp. v. Ridenour, NO. 07-96-0008, 1996 Tex.App. LEXIS 3380 (Aug. 1, 1996), see infra 
at 16-24. 
 20. COPI & COHEN, supra note 4, at 299.  The mixed hypothetical syllogism is “mixed” because it contains 
only one hypothetical premise.   The other premise is a categorical one.  Therefore it is a mixed hypothetical 
syllogism.  This type is contrasted with a pure hypothetical syllogism, which would include two hypothetical 
premises.   
 21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §175(1) (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of 
assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the 
contract is voidable by the victim.”); see also, id. at §175(2) (enumerating what constitute “improper” threats).
 22. In this example, the structure of the syllogism is more readily apparent if we reduce its components to 
symbols.  If we assign  the term “transfer of an interest in land” the letter “A” and assign “within the statute of 
frauds” the letter “B” the syllogism takes this form:
If A then B. 
A. 
Therefore B.  
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1. If assent to enter into a contract is made because of an impro-
per threat that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, then the 
contract is voidable by the victim. 23
2. The contract is voidable by the victim. 
3. Therefore, the assent to enter into the contract was made be-
cause of an improper threat. 24
Understanding the nature of this logically invalid argument and why it is logi-
cally invalid (and legally incorrect) requires an understanding of the rules govern-
ing validity of hypothetical syllogisms.  A hypothetical syllogism must meet two 
basic logical rules in order to have a deductively valid form.  If the form of the 
syllogism is invalid, then the syllogism cannot be relied upon to ensure the truth of 
the conclusion.25  Where a syllogism violates one of these rules of logical form, the 
syllogism is invalid, and the argument is said to be fallacious.26  Accordingly, iden-
tifying the fallacious pattern of argument structure is really just a method for iden-
tifying what established rule of logic is violated by the argument.  The process is 
similar to many we engage in to solve problems.  We look for hallmarks of estab-
lished problems all the time.  For example, if I remove the spark plugs from my 
vintage motorcycle, and they are heavily “sooted” or covered with black carbon 
deposits, then I know that the mixture of oxygen and fuel is too rich, and I should 
adjust the carburetors.27   I know this because a dark or sooted spark plug is a sim-
ple, obvious, hallmark of a more complex problem, i.e., improper mixture of oxy-
gen and fuel in the carburetors of an internal combustion motorcycle engine.  More 
importantly, I am able to identify this without evaluating all of the inner workings 
of a relatively sophisticated piece of machinery.  In a sense, the hallmark of exces-
 ________________________  
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is 
induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is 
voidable by the victim.”); see also id. § 175(2) (enumerating what constitute “improper” threats).
 24. In this example, the structure of the syllogism is more readily apparent if we reduce its components to 
symbols.  If we assign  the term “transfer of an interest in land” the letter “A” and assign “within the statute of 
frauds” the letter “B” the syllogism takes this form: 
If A then B. 
A. 
Therefore B.  
 25. See DOUGLAS WALTON, INFORMAL LOGIC, A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 138 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2008) (“In a deductively valid argument, it is logically impossible for the premises to be true and the conclu-
sion false”).
 26. HAMBLIN, supra note 1, at 35-37.  See supra text accompanying note 20 (discussing the distinction 
between pure and mixed hypothetical syllogisms). 
 27. See, e.g., WORKSHOP MANUAL FOR BONNEVILLE 750 AND TIGER 750 UNIT CONSTRUCTION TWINS, H7 
(Abbot Litho Press Ltd., 1984).  While contemporary combustion engines generally include a fuel injection system 
that dispenses with the need for a carburetor, older engines used carburetors as a means of mixing oxygen and fuel 
and regulating the balance of the fuel mixture before it enters the combustion chamber where it fires the engine 
and powers the vehicle.  The carburetor can be adjusted to increase the amount of air (thereby making the mixture 
more “lean”) or decreasing the amount of air (thereby making the mixture more “rich”).
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sive fuel in the oxygen and fuel mixture required to fire a combustion engine is a 
sooty or “fouled” spark plug.
Similarly, lawyers should use hallmarks to efficiently identify logically falla-
cious legal reasoning.  The hallmark of a “fouled” legal argument is a fallacious 
pattern of reasoning.  Identifying the pattern will demonstrate that there is a prob-
lem with the logical form of the argument, without requiring the evaluator to mas-
ter the inner workings of philosophical logic or its application to legal reasoning. A 
litigator’s ability to label their opponent’s argument as necessarily illogical pro-
vides a powerful advocacy tool.  A judge’s ability to evaluate a litigant’s argument 
as necessarily illogical provides a sound, tested means of explaining away a legal 
argument.  A law student’s understanding of logical fallacies helps them to under-
stand legal reasoning as a discipline.   
The rules of valid hypothetical syllogisms are simple, but their simplicity is 
what makes them so easy to violate without notice.  A hypothetical syllogism must 
contain a conditional premise, a categorical premise, and a conclusion.28  The con-
ditional premise is the part of the syllogism that contains a condition.  This is gen-
erally an “if, then” statement. For example, the sentence “if a contract is within the 
statute of frauds,29 then it must be in writing” is a conditional premise.  This condi-
tional premise is made up of two terms: the term that immediately follows the “if”
and the term that immediately follows the “then.”  The term that immediately fol-
lows the “if” term is the antecedent term.  The term that follows the “then” term is 
the consequent term.  In the example, “if a contract is within the statute of frauds, 
then it must be in writing,” the term “a contract is within the statute of frauds” is 
the antecedent term.  The term “must be in writing” is the consequent term.30
The categorical premise is the part of the syllogism that either affirms or denies 
one of the two terms in the conditional premise.  If we add a categorical premise to 
the previous example of a conditional premise, it might state:  “The contract is 
within the statute of frauds.”  This would be a categorical premise, which affirms 
the antecedent term.  It affirms the antecedent term because it asserts that the ante-
cedent term is true.  Conversely, if the conditional premise stated:  “The contract is 
not within the statute of frauds,” then it would have denied the antecedent term, 
since it asserts that the antecedent term is not true. 
Understanding terms used to describe hypothetical syllogisms paves the way to 
understanding the simple rules that determine whether a hypothetical syllogism 
takes a valid form or, alternatively, an invalid, fallacious form.  In order to be valid, 
a hypothetical syllogism must take one of two forms.  The first form, given the 
name modus ponens, requires that the categorical premise must affirm the truth of 
the antecedent of the conditional premise and the consequent of the conditional 
premise must be the conclusion.  Therefore, if the categorical premise is “if A, then 
 ________________________  
 28. COPI & COHEN, supra note 4, at 301. 
 29. Where a contract fits the criteria for one of those categories, enumerated in the Statute of Frauds, it 
generally is required to be in writing to be enforceable.  Where a contract meets the criteria of one or more of these 
categories, it is said to be “within” the Statute of Frauds.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 cmts. a, 
b (1981). 
 30. COPI & COHEN, supra note 4, at 299. 
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B” “A” is the “antecedent” and “B” is the consequent.   The syllogism is well-
formed if the categorical premise affirms the truth of the antecedent term of the 
hypothetical “A” and the conclusion affirms the truth of the consequent of the hy-
pothetical “B”.31  Accordingly, the following would be an example of a well-
formed hypothetical in the form known as modus ponens. 
1. If assent to enter into a contract is made because of an impro-
per threat that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, then the 
contract is voidable by the victim.32
2. Assent to the contract was made because of an improper threat. 
3. Therefore, the contract is voidable by the victim.
Simplifying the syllogism, but reducing the terms to alphabetical symbols, fur-
ther reveals the logical structure of modus ponens. 
1. If A is true, then B is true. 
2. A is true. 
3. Therefore, B is true. 
Similarly, there is a second form of the hypothetical that is also valid.  The 
second from is called modus tollens.  If the categorical premise affirms the falsity 
of the consequent of the conditional premise, and the conclusion asserts the falsity 
of the antecedent of that conditional premise, then that syllogism is well-formed.33
Accordingly the following would be an example of a well-formed hypothetical in 
the form of modus tollens.34
1. If assent to enter into a contract is made because of an impro-
per that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, then the con-
tract is voidable by the victim.35
2. The contract is not voidable by the victim. 
 ________________________  
 31. HAMBLIN, supra note 1, at 35-37; see also, DOUGLAS WALTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRITICAL 
ARGUMENTATION 62 (2005). 
 32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of 
assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the 
contract is voidable by the victim.”); see also id. at § 175(2) (enumerating what constitute “improper” threats).
 33. Id.
 34. COPI & COHEN, supra note 4 at 301-302. 
 35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of 
assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the 




Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2010
10 Barry Law Review Vol. 14 
3. Therefore, assent to enter into the contract was not made be-
cause of an improper threat that leaves the victim no reasonable al-
ternative.
Again, reducing the syllogism’s terms to alphabetical symbols reveals the form 
of modus ponens. 
1. If A is true, then B. 
2. B is false. 
3. Therefore, A is false. 
A rule that describes both forms, modus ponens and modus tollens, has been 
summarized this way:  “A valid hypothetical syllogism either denies the conse-
quent . . . or affirms the antecedent . . . of the major premises; it doesn’t deny the 
antecedent or affirm the consequent.” 36
III. THE FALLACY OF AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT
When a hypothetical syllogism fails to follow this rule, and thereby fails to 
take the form of modus tollens or modus ponens, it commits a logical fallacy.  
Where the syllogism, instead of denying the consequent term of the conditional 
premise, affirms that term, it commits the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent.37
The reason why this pattern of argument is fallacious is apparent.  While the hypo-
thetical premise “If A, then B” requires us to infer B from A, there is no reason 
why we should infer A from B.  One can infer that if the sun is shining through my 
window, my office is illuminated.  However, it would be improper to infer that, 
since my office is illuminated, the sun is shining through my office window.38
When the categorical premise “affirms the consequent” it attempts to make this 
same improper inference.  Some examples clarify why this is impermissible.  Take 
the example syllogism: 
1. If assent to enter into a contract is made because of an impro-
per threat that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, then the 
contract is voidable by the victim. 
2. Assent to the contract was made because of an improper threat. 
3. Therefore, the contract is voidable by the victim.
 ________________________  
 36. NORMAN L. GEISLER & RONALD M. BROOKS, COME LET US REASON: AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGICAL 
THINKING 65 (1990). 
 37. Conversely, where the syllogism, instead of affirming the antecedent term, denies it, the syllogism 
commits the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent. 
 38. The light in my office will illuminate it at night. 
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If the hypothetical premise is true, and it is, since it is an established rule of 
law, then we can infer the consequent term from the antecedent.  We know that 
improper threats, leaving no reasonable alternatives, make a contract voidable.  
However, we have no reason to infer the opposite, i.e., that where a contract is 
voidable it must have been assented to under improper threat.  There are lots of 
reasons why contracts are voidable.  For example, mental illness or defect, 39 undue 
influence, 40 misrepresentation, 41 in addition to duress, are all events that make a 
contract voidable.  While we might agree that all contracts entered into under du-
ress are voidable, we know that not all contracts that are voidable, were entered 
into under duress. 
Thinking through this example makes it clear that the argument is invalid.  Its 
premises cannot ensure the truth of its conclusion.  However, what makes this cat-
egory of fallacious argument so dangerous is that it frequently goes undetected.  
One classic definition of a fallacious argument is: “A fallacious argument, as al-
most every account from Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid 
but is not so.”42  The second half of this definition is particularly salient for law-
yers.  The problem for litigators is that these arguments are regularly made, and 
regularly undetected.  Why does this happen?  One reason is that, as was discussed 
above, we are comfortable with syllogistic argument.  In fact, the hypothetical syl-
logism is such a familiar thread in the fabric of legal argument that litigators fre-
quently overlook the structurally subtle differences between, for example, modus 
ponens and the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent.   
While the difference between the logical form of a valid hypothetical syllogism 
and an invalid logical fallacy might be subtle, the logical consequence of the two is 
profound.  An argument based on a logically fallacious form is necessarily invalid.  
It cannot support the conclusion, even if its premises are true.  If a party can identi-
fy and explain the fallacious nature of an argument, its opposition must find a new 
argument to support the conclusion.43
 ________________________  
 39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (1981) (“A person incurs only voidable contractual 
duties by entering into a transaction if by reason of mental illness or defect (a) he is unable to understand in a 
reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable man-
ner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.”)
 40. See id. at § 177 (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by undue influence by the other party, 
the contract is voidable by the victim.”)
 41. See id. at § 164 (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material 
misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the 
recipient.”)
 42. HAMBLIN, supra note 1, at 12; see also H. V. Hansen, The Straw Thing of Fallacy Theory: The Stan-
dard Definition of ‘Fallacy’, 16 ARGUMENTATION 133 (2002) (discussing various theories of logical fallacy). 
 43. While a logically fallacious argument cannot support its conclusion, it does not require that the conclu-
sion be necessarily false.   Instead, it requires the party positing the fallacious argument to either find a new, valid 
argument, or concede defeat. 
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IV. COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED ARGUMENTS AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT 
AS LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS, AND REJECTED THEM AS LOGICALLY INVALID 
AND UNRELIABLE
In Stewart Foods v. Broecker (In re Stewart Foods), the court used the fallacy 
of Affirming the Consequent to evaluate a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy.44   The 
creditor in In re Stewart Foods, signed a Salary Continuation Retirement Plan with 
the debtor, Stewart Foods (the “Agreement”).  The Agreement provided that the 
creditor would “remain employed with Stewart Foods until he reached the age of 
65 and, upon retirement, would receive income for the next ten years.”45  The par-
ties modified the Agreement to provide for payment of equal payments of $7,104 
per month for 120 months.  The debtor made 19 payments to the creditor, filed a 
petition for bankruptcy protection, and then discontinued making the monthly 
payments.  The creditor filed a Proof of Claim (the “Claim”) for the remaining 
payments owed with the bankruptcy court.46
The debtor opposed the Claim, first by characterizing the Claim as an executo-
ry47 contract, which the debtor would have the right to reject. 48  However, it later 
stipulated that the contract was non-executory.  Second, the debtor opposed the 
Claim by characterizing it as a pre-petition claim against the estate and arguing that 
it had no continuing obligation to make the payments after the date of filing of the 
bankruptcy petition.  The creditor argued that the contract was not a mere pre-
petition claim, but that it was a continuing agreement to pay salary, and that the 
debtor should continue to make the monthly payments.49
The district court ruled that, since the debtor took the position that since the 
creditor has a pre-petition claim, creditor was rejecting a non-executory contract.  
The court reasoned from the principle that a creditor who has its executory contract 
rejected by the debtor has a right to a general pre-petition claim in bankruptcy.  It 
went on to conclude that, since the debtor conceded that the creditor had a claim, 
the court must conclude that the debtor rejected its executory contract.50
The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this analysis, rely-
ing on the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent.  The court recognized that:  
 ________________________  
 44. 64 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 45. Id. at 143. 
 46. Id.
 47. Id.; Elizabeth A. Cameron & Salina Maxwell, Protecting Consumers: The Contractual and Real 
Estate Issues Involving Timeshares, Quatershares, and Fractional Ownership, 37 REAL EST. L.J. 278, 289 (2009) 
(“The exact criteria for defining an executory contract is complex and there is no precise definition, but for the 
purposes of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, an executory contract is an agreement in which any part of the 
contract remains unperformed.”); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 261 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) ( 
“[T]he ability to reject an executory contract is rooted in the principle of maximizing the return to creditors by 
permitting a debtor in possession to renounce title to and abandon burdensome property if such action is in the best 
interests of the estate.”).
 48. Stewart Foods, 64 F.3d at 144 (debtor claimed it would have the right to reject an executor contract 
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The district court’s reasoning was logically flawed. The district 
court noted that, under §§ 365 and 502(g), the rejection of an ex-
ecutory contract creates a general unsecured claim. From this pre-
mise, the district court erroneously inferred that the existence of a 
general unsecured claim must imply the rejection of an executory 
contract. 
The court went on to describe the flawed form of the district court’s reasoning: 
This type of inference is an example of affirming the consequent, a 
classic form of invalid reasoning. Consider the following syllog-
ism: 
(1) If A is true, then B is true. 
(2) B is true. 
(3) Therefore, A is also true. 
The conclusion that A is true does not logically follow from the premises. The 
district court’s reasoning roughly reduces to the following syllogism: 
(1) If a debtor rejects a contract, then a general unsecured claim 
exists. 
(2) A general unsecured claim exists. 
(3) Therefore, the debtor must have rejected a contract.51
As the court recognized, the district court’s reasoning is necessarily invalid, 
since it fits into this fallacious pattern of reasoning.  Importantly, the use of the 
Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent provided the court of appeals with a mechan-
ism to explain what is wrong with the district court’s logic and why it is wrong.  
Frequently, legal arguments become convoluted.  Parties can use inconsistent terms 
and structure in drafting their arguments.  Formal logic provides a consistent 
framework for organizing legal argument in consistent terms, and a consistent syl-
logistic structure.  This structure allows legal thinkers to comparatively analyze 
legal argument, by comparing and contrasting it to necessarily valid or invalid log-
ical structures, and reach conclusive logical decisions about the validity or invalidi-
ty of the form of the argument.52  The court used the Fallacy of Affirming the Con-
sequent for just such a purpose in Stewart Foods.
 ________________________  
 51. Id. at 145, n.3. 
 52. One writer has described the language of logic as a metalanguage for evaluating arguments as “it’s 
necessary to distinguish between the logician’s language with its concepts, and the reasoner’s language with its 
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Next, in City of Green Ridge v. Kreisel,53 the court also used the fallacy of Af-
firming the Consequent to analyze the plaintiff’s argument.  Defendant Kreisel was 
operating a junkyard that the City of Green Ridge sought to regulate by establish-
ing an ordinance (“Ordinance 477”)54 that provided a set of requirements for jun-
kyards, and the ramifications of a junkyard’s failure to meet the requirements.55
Kreisel argued that the ordinance constituted a zoning ordinance, and that it was 
invalid since it failed to meet the procedural requirements for a zoning ordinance.56
The City of Green Ridge counter argued that the ordinance was not a zoning ordin-
concepts.  For convenience let’s call the logician’s language the metalanguage and the reasoner’s language the 
object language.”  (emphasis in original).  JACQUETTE, ET AL., PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 43 (2006). 
 53. 25 S.W.3d 559, 563-64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 54. The ordinance provided: 
Section 2. General operating requirements. The following general operating requirements 
shall apply to all junkyard operators and junkyard owners operating within the City of 
Green Ridge, Missouri: 
a. The junkyard, together with things kept therein, shall at all times be maintained in a sani-
tary condition. 
b. No water shall be allowed to stand in any place on the premises in such matter as to af-
ford a breeding place for mosquitoes. 
c. Weeds and vegetation on the premises, other than trees, shall be kept at a height of not 
more than four inches. 
d. No garbage or other waste liable to give off a foul order or attract vermin shall be kept on 
the premises; nor shall any refuse of any kind be kept on the premises. 
e. No junk shall be allowed to rest upon or protrude over any public property, street, alley, 
walkway, or curb or become scattered, washed off or blown off the business premises. 
f. Junk shall be stored in piles not exceeding ten feet in height and shall be arranged so as to 
permit easy access to all such junk for fire fighting purposes. 
g. No combustible material of any kind not necessary or beneficial to the business shall be 
kept on the premises; nor shall the premises be allowed to become a fire hazard. 
h. Gasoline and oil shall be removed from any scrapped engines or vehicles on the premises. 
i. No junk or other material shall be burned on the premises in any matter [sic] not meeting 
the approval of the chief of the fire department, which approval shall not be unreasonably 
denied. 
j. No noisy processing of junk or other noisy activity shall be carried [**8]  on in connection 
with the business on Sunday, Christmas, Thanksgiving, or at any time between the hours of 
6:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. 
k. The area on the premises where junk is kept (other than indoors) shall be enclosed, except 
for entrances and exits, with a solid vertical wall or fence of a minimum height of eight (8) 
feet measured from ground level. Entrances and exits shall not be wider or more numerous 
than reasonably necessary for the conduct of the licensed business. Said wall or fence and 
its posts (which shall be placed on the inside of said wall or fence) shall be constructed of 
wood which is treated so as not to rot or be susceptible to termites or other similar pests, and 
shall be constructed, maintained and anchored so as not to sag, become unsightly, or fall 
over in high winds. 
Id. at 562 (quoting Section 1 of City of Green Ridge, Ordinance 477) (Emphasis in original). 
 55. City of Green Ridge, 25 S.W.3d at 562-63. 
 56. Id. at 561 (quoting MO. ANN. STAT. § 89.09 (West 2009):  “The legislative body of such municipality 
shall provide for the manner in which such [zoning] regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of such dis-
tricts shall be determined, established, and enforced, and from time to time amended, supplemented, or changed. 
However, no such regulation, restriction, or boundary shall become effective until after a public hearing in 
relation thereto, at which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard. At least fifteen 
days’ notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be published in an official paper or a paper of general 
circulation in such municipality.”) (emphasis in original).
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ance and did not have to be promulgated pursuant to the requirements for zoning 
ordinances.57
Kreisel made an argument that relied on the fact that the zoning ordinance sta-
tute provided that zoning ordinances could be used to promote public health and 
safety.58  The court described Kriesel’s argument this way:  “He argues, therefore, 
that since zoning ordinances regulate health and safety through regulating the use 
of buildings, and since this ordinance addresses health and safety in his operation 
of his junkyard, therefore this ordinance is a zoning ordinance.”59  The court went 
on to describe the fallacious logical structure of the argument: 
Mr. Kreisel’s argument commits the logical fallacy of “affirming the conse-
quent.”  He fails to recognize that, while zoning ordinances may address health and 
safety issues, other types of ordinances may also address health and safety issues 
without becoming zoning ordinances. In other words, the mere fact that a purpose 
of zoning ordinances is to regulate public safety does not mean that all ordinances 
which regulate health and safety are zoning ordinances. To the contrary, there are 
many other kinds of ordinances which also regulate public health and safety.60
Unlike the court in In re Stewart Foods, the court in Kreisel did not break 
down the argument symbolically.  However, doing so better illustrates how both In 
re Stewart Foods and Kreisel, while they deal with significantly different subject 
matter, were decided based on identical logical grounds.   
Kreisel’s argument, examined syllogistically, appears this way: 
1. If an ordinance is a zoning ordinance, then it regulates health 
and safety through regulating the use of buildings. 
2. This ordinance regulates health and safety. 
3. Therefore this ordinance is a zoning ordinance. 
Simplifying the syllogism using symbols yields this result: 
1. If A, then B. 
2. B. 
3. Therefore, A. 
Accordingly, the court in Kreisel was able to use the Fallacy of Affirming the 
Consequent to analyze and explain what was wrong with Kreisel’s argument. 
Like Kreisel, which used a logical fallacy to solve a problem with a statutory 
definition, the court in Paulson v. State 61 also made use of the Fallacy of Affirm-
 ________________________  
 57. Id. at 563. 
 58. Id.
 59. Id.
 60. Id. at 563-64. 
 61. 28 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
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ing the Consequent in solving a different definitional problem.  In Paulson, the 
court considered the propriety of a jury instruction mandated by a previous court 
decision.  The jury instruction dealt with the definition of “reasonable doubt.”   The 
court reviewed the previous definition of “reasonable doubt,” which had provided: 
It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in 
the most important of his own affairs. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt therefore must be proof of such a convincing cha-
racter that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the 
most important of your own affairs.62
The court focused on the definition “proof beyond a reasonable doubt therefore 
must be proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and 
act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.”63   The 
court rejected this definition because it violated the rules of logic.  The court de-
scribed it as a logically fallacious application of the previous definition “the kind of 
doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of 
his own affairs.”  The court explained its conclusion this way: “The court says that 
reasonable doubt makes you hesitate to act; therefore, if you hesitate to act, you 
have a reasonable doubt. That is like saying, “Pneumonia makes you cough; there-
fore, if you cough, you have pneumonia.” This is the logical fallacy called “affirm-
ing the consequent.”64  The logical fallacy here is not immediately apparent from 
the court’s explanation.  However, it suggests that it arranged its syllogistic com-
ponents this way: 
1. If the evidence makes the jury hesitate, then the jury has rea-
sonable doubt. 
2. The evidence makes the jury hesitate.65
 ________________________  
 62. The court was reviewing the approved instruction defining “reasonable doubt” in Geesa v. State, 820 
S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  The court in Paulson was actually addressing a three part definition pro-
vided by the Geesa court.  However, for purposes of logical fallacy analysis, the Paulson court only considered 
two of the Geesa court’s three definitions.  The three definitions, as described by the Paulson court were:   “A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful and impartial consideration of all 
the evidence in the case;”  “It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most 
important of his own affairs;” and “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt therefore must be proof of such a convincing 




 65. This formulation of the court’s recitation of the argument here is merely a summary, in positive terms, 
of the second “definition” of reasonable doubt.  The definition was originally stated in the negative, in order to 
couch the definition in the familiar parlance of “beyond a reasonable doubt”:  “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
therefore must be proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without 
hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.”  Stated in the affirmative, this could be summarized to 
merely say that “if a jury hesitates, then it has reasonable doubt.”  Simplifying this language reveals an ambiguity 
in the definition itself.  Is the definition connoting that “hesitation” and “reasonable doubt” are the same?  Alterna-
tively, is the definition telling the jury that if it hesitates, then it has “reasonable doubt?”  It would seem that the 
later is the intended meaning of this language.  It appears that the court interpreted this “third” definition as some-
thing distinct from the “second” definition.  It might have reasonably decided that the “third” definition was not a 
distinct definition at all or, for that matter, that it was never intended as a premise of an argument.  Had it con-
16
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3. Therefore, the jury has reasonable doubt. 66
First, it is apparent that the court’s summary of the syllogistic form of the jury 
instruction’s logic, that this is not the structure of Affirming the Consequent.  Ap-
parently the Court in Paulson, in concluding that the form of the instruction was 
logically fallacious, did not interpret the language that way.  Instead, it appears to 
have interpreted the language this way: 
1. If the evidence makes the jury hesitate, then the jury has rea-
sonable doubt. 
2. The jury has reasonable doubt. 
3. Therefore, the jury hesitated. 
Simply put, the court’s objection to the instruction is this: while reasonable 
doubt may be properly inferred from a jury’s hesitation, there is no reason to infer 
hesitation from reasonable doubt.  For example, if a jury is entirely convinced that 
a defendant has met its standard of proof, it may well reach the conclusion of rea-
sonable doubt without the need to hesitate in any way. 
Similarly, in Gilliam v Nev. Power67 the court used the Fallacy of Affirming 
the Consequent to solve a legal problem.  The court in Gilliam was faced with the 
issue of determining whether certain severance payment received by the plaintiff 
constituted “earnings” under her retirement plan (“Plan”). 68  The plaintiff received 
a severance payment of $512,000.69  The Plan defined “earnings” as “total wages 
and salary as reported by the Company for federal income tax purposes for the ca-
lendar year.”  Accordingly, the litigants focused their arguments on whether the 
severance payment constituted “wages and salary.”
Gilliam argued that since her employer reported the severance payment in Box 
1 of her federal W-2 form, the place designated for an employer to report “wages
and salary,” her severance payment must be “wages and salary” under the Plan.  
The court used the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent to dispose of this argu-
ment: 
This argument rests on the logical fallacy of affirming the conse-
quent.  While Nevada Power Company must report “wages and 
salary” on Box 1 of the federal Form W-2, not all amounts re-
ported in Box 1 of the federal Form W-2 must be “wages and sala-
ry.” For example, the 1999 Instructions for Forms W-2 and W-3 
cluded either or those things, then the argument would not be an appropriate candidate for analysis as a Fallacy of 
Affirming the Consequent. 
 66. 28 S.W.3d at 572. 
 67. 488 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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explain that Box 1 includes many employee income items other 
than “wages and salary.”70
Accordingly, the Court in Gilliam interpreted Gilliam’s argument this way: 
1. If the employer pays “wages and salary” then it must be re-
ported in Box 1. 
2. The employer reported payments in Box 1. 
3. Therefore, the payment must be “wages and salary.”
As the court aptly stated, the fact that wages and salary must be reported in 
Box 1, does not require the inference that everything reported in Box 1 is wages 
and salary.  Of course, this is the essence of what is “wrong” with an argument that 
fits the pattern of the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent. 
Another case, United Tel. Co. v. Federal Communications Com.,71 considered a 
similar argument regarding the petitioner’s challenge to a formula for the division 
of revenues.72    The lower court affirmed the FCC’s decision to dismiss the peti-
tioners’ petitions without hearing based on the fact that neither petitioner had suffi-
ciently challenged the reasonableness of the settlement formula for dividing reve-
nues, which was the heart of the dispute.73  Instead the petitioners relied “on the 
implication that a settlement formula which does not provide a higher rate of return 
to a company whose overall operations make it a riskier economic enterprise than 
its co-participant is ipso facto unjust and unreasonable.”  Petitioners provided no 
evidence that the result of the settlement formula was unjust.  Instead, they argued 
that the result must be unjust since the formula was unjust.74
The court framed the problem with this argument in terms of the Fallacy of Af-
firming the Consequent: 
The Commission properly characterized United’s and Carolina’s
arguments as an attempt to attack the formula for dividing charges 
without alleging that the result of that formula is in fact unjust and 
unreasonable. United and Carolina insist that if the method of di-
viding charges is unjust and unreasonable, its result must also be 
unjust and unreasonable. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10. This ex-
ercise in sophistry miscasts the issue by reversing the logic of the 
 ________________________  
 70. Id. at 1197 n.7. 
 71. 559 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See Internal Revenue Service, 1999 Instructions for Forms W-2 and W-
3, at 7 (1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs--prior/iw2-1999.pdf; see also Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 21, 25 (1978) (“Wages usually are income, but many items qualify as income and yet 
clearly are not wages.”)
 72. Id. at 725-26 (citing IRVING COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 202 (3d ed. 1968) and describing the 
principle utilized as “fallacy of affirming the consequent.”)
 73. Id. at 724-25. 
 74. Id. at 725. 
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inquiry. A method of determining rates, or divisions thereof, is un-
just and unreasonable if the result reached does not afford a com-
pensatory return. One cannot, as United and Carolina try to do, re-
verse the order of this proposition and preserve its logical validity.
75
Considered syllogistically, the petitioner’s argument looked like this: 
1. If the application of the settlement formula yields an unjust re-
sult, then the settlement formula is unjust. 
2. The settlement formula is unjust. 
3.    Therefore, the application of the settlement formula yields an 
unjust result. 
Just as the preceding courts, the court in United Tel. Co. identified a pattern of 
argument that is Denying the Antecedent, realized its logical unreliability, and re-
jected the argument on grounds of philosophical logic. 
V. HOW TO RECOGNIZE THE FALLACY AND USE IT TO DEFEAT FALLACIOUS
REASONING
These case examples make plain this fallacious pattern and help to identify this 
logically fallacious pattern and explain why it is unreliable.  Compare the argu-
ments made in In re Stewart Foods, Kreisel, Gilliam, and United Tel. Co., respec-
tively: 
1. If a debtor rejects a contract, then a general unsecured claim 
exists. 
2. A general unsecured claim exists. 
3. Therefore, the debtor must have rejected a contract. 76
1. If an ordinance is a zoning ordinance, then it regulates health 
and safety through regulating the use of buildings. 
2. This ordinance regulates health and safety. 
3. Therefore this ordinance is a zoning ordinance. 77
 ________________________  
 75. Id. at 725-26 (citing IRVING COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 202 (3d ed. 1968)). 
 76. In re Stewart Foods, 64 F.3d at 145. 
 77. City of Green Ridge 25 S.W. 3d at, 563-64. 
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1. If the employer pays “wages and salary” then it must be re-
ported in Box 1. 
2. The employer reported payments in Box 1. 
3. Therefore, the payment must be “wages and salary.” 78
1. If the application of the settlement formula yields an unjust re-
sult, then the settlement formula is unjust. 
2. The settlement formula is unjust. 
3. Therefore, the application of the settlement formula yields an 
unjust result. 79
Each of these arguments takes the same invalid syllogistic form, illustrated 
symbolically as: 
If A, then B. 
B.
Therefore, A. 
Each argument suffers from the same invalid pattern of logical form.  Each 
invalid pattern of logical form is infected with the false suggestion that there exists 
a reciprocal causative relationship between two terms.  Where one term requires 
the other, while it is possible that the other reciprocally requires the first, it is not 
necessarily the case.  In fact, frequently there is no reason whatsoever to believe 
that such a bilateral causative relationship exists.  Such is the case with debtors 
who reject contracts,80 ordinances that control zoning,81 employers that pay “wages 
and salaries,”82 and settlement formulas that yield unjust results83 in the cases dis-
cussed supra.84
In each case, this pattern is a hallmark of an argument that must fail.  By iden-
tifying this hallmark pattern, a lawyer can immediately diffuse the argument’s su-
perficial appeal.  The rule of a well-formed hypothetical provides that the syllog-
ism is well-formed if the categorical premise affirms the truth of the antecedent 
term of the hypothetical and the conclusion affirms the truth of the consequent of 
 ________________________  
 78. Gilliam, 488 F.3d at 1197. 
 79. United Tel. Co., 559 F.2d at 725. 
 80. In re Stewart Foods, 64 F.3d at 145. 
 81. City of Green Ridge, 25 S.W.3d 563-564. 
 82. Gilliam,488 F.3d at 1197 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 83. United Tel. Co., 559 F.2d at 725. 
 85. Stewart Foods, 64 F.3d at 145; City of Green Ridge, 25 S.W. 3d at 563-64; Gilliam, 488 F.3d at 1197; 
United Tel. Co., 559 F.2d at 725. 
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the hypothetical.85  Where the argument violates this rule by affirming the conse-
quent, instead of the antecedent term of the hypothetical premise, it commits the 
Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent, and must fail. 
One would be prudent to anticipate that some judges will be unfamiliar with 
rules of philosophical logic or their precedential value as legal authority.  Accor-
dingly, citation to the cases above will provide legal authority for the use of logical 
fallacy in legal argument.  There are scores of cases that have used the rules of 
philosophical logic and specific fallacies as the basis for evaluating legal argu-
ments.  For example, courts have employed the Fallacies of the Undistributed Mid-
dle Term,86 the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent,87 and Illicit Process of the Ma-
jor or Minor Term.88 Many of those cases specifically address the Fallacy of Af-
 ________________________  
 85. See GEISLER & BROOKS, supra note 36 at 63 (1990). 
 86. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 578-79 (1967); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 
333 U.S. 127, 134 (1948); Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. USX Corp., 249 F.3d 191, 202 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Aylett v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev. ex rel. Burris, 54 F.3d 1560, 1569 (10th Cir. 1995); Hernandez v. Denton, 
861 F.2d 1421, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1988) (vacated and remanded on other grounds, Denton v. Hernandez, 493 U.S. 
801 (1989)); Regalado v. City of Chicago, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14902 *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1999); British 
Steel PLC v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 426, 436 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996); Lucas Aerospace v. Unison Indus., L.P., 
899 F. Supp. 1268, 1287 (D. Del. 1995); Foster v. McGrail, 844 F. Supp. 16, 20 (D. Mass. 1994); Pearson v. 
Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 782, 792 (D. Ill. 1986); United States v. Gambale, 610 F. Supp. 1515, 1525 (D. Mass. 1985); 
Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 595 F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (E.D. La. 1984) (aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1985)); Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 527 F. 
Supp. 632, 636 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Lakeland Constr. Co. v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Local No. 362, 
1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11584, *4 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1981); Glenn v. Mason, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13233, 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1980); Desilu Prod., Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1965-307, *34 (T.C. 1965); Batty v. Ariz. 
State Dental Bd., 112 P.2d 870, 873 (Ariz. 1941); Nickolas v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
208, 222, (Cal. Ct. 2006); People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 321-22 (Colo. 2003); Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 
1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  1979); Barham v. Richard, 692 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Star 
Enter., 691 So. 2d 1221, 1230 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Wein v. Carey, 362 N.E.2d 587, 590-91  (N.Y. 1977); Hicks v. 
State, 241 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Zespy, 723 P.2d 564, 570 (Wyo. 1986). 
 87. Carver v. Lehman, 528 F.3d 659, 671 (9th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, 540 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Agri Processor Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Brd., 514 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2008); E. Armata, Inc. v. Korea Com-
mer. Bank of N.Y., 367 F.3d 123, 129 n.7, 132 n.10 (2d Cir. 2004); Torpharm Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 336 
F.3d 1322, 1329 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 703 & n.20 (2d Cir. 
1980); Nw. Steel Erection Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4082, *4 & n.5 (D. Neb. Jan. 18, 
2008); Bell Atl. Corp. v. MFS Commc’ns Co., 901 F. Supp. 835, 849 (D. Del. 1995); Villines v. Harris, 11 S.W.3d 
516, 520 &   n.2 (Ark. 2000); Thomson v. Beuchel, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6242, n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 
31 2007); Thompson v. Clarkson Power Flow, Inc., 254 S.E.2d 401, 402 & n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); French v. 
State, 362 N.E.2d 834, 842-43 & n.1  (Ind. 1977); Mark v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 2005 Minn. App. LEXIS 500, 
*4-5 & n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 10, 2005); Health Pers. v. Peterson, 629 N.W.2d 132, 134-35 & n.3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001); State v. Clifford, 121 P.3d 489, 501 (Mont. 2005); State v. Wetzel, 114 P.3d 269, 275-76(Mont. 
2005); Dep’t 56, Inc. v. Bloom, 720 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922-23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Iams v. Daimlerchrysler, Corp., 
883 N.E.2d 466, 478-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Edwards v. Riverdale Sch. Dist., 188 P.3d 317, 320 (Or. Ct. App. 
2008); Hale v. Water Res. Dep’t., 55 P.3d 497, 502(Or. Ct. App. 2002); In re Luna, 175 S.W.3d 315, 320 & n.4 
(2004), opinion withdrawn, In re Luna, 275 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App. 2008); Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 269, 
278-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Zinpro Corp. v. Ridenour, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3380, at *10 n.4 (Tex. App.  
Aug. 1, 1996). 
 88. Baker v. Amoco Oil Co., 761 F. Supp. 1386, 1392 (E.D. Wis. 1991); State v. Zespy, 723 P.2d 564, 570, 
n.1 (Wyo. 1986); Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1439 (9th Cir. 1988); Caterpillar Inc. v. United States, 20 
C.I.T. 1169 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996); Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State Legislature, 142 Idaho 640, 650 (2006); Central 
Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 16 Pa. D. & C. 4th 289, 296 (1992); State v. Euman, 558 
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firming the Consequent.89  Accordingly, the legal authority for using the conven-
tion of logical fallacy to evaluate a legal argument is substantial. 
However, the impact of the logical fallacy has its limits.  While the fallacy is a 
powerful tool for exposing and diffusing the influence of an illogical argument, it 
does not necessarily invalidate the conclusion.  Instead, it only invalidates the form 
of the argument purporting to support the conclusion.  If an argument’s structure is 
logically invalid, the result is that the argument cannot be used to support the truth 
of the conclusion.  Another, logically sound, argument might still be crafted to 
support the conclusion.  However, identifying and explaining the illogical nature of 
the argument, will take the opponent to task, requiring that they either devise a 
logically valid argument to support their conclusion or concede defeat. 
VI. MAKING LOGIC CONSPICUOUS AGAIN
Formal logic can be a powerful advocacy tool for litigators.  It can provide a 
mechanism and a language for them to analyze and discuss the shortcomings in 
their opponents’ legal arguments.  Formal logic is important to judges, whose deci-
sion making processes, and whose opinions articulate those processes, need to be 
grounded in traditional, consistent logic.  Formal logic can be invaluable to the 
student of law engaged in mastering the discipline of legal reasoning.  It provides a 
structure for legal reasoning.  It shows the student what regal reasoning, a frequent-
ly elusive concept to legal neophytes, “looks like.”
In fact, even for the experienced litigator, revealing what legal argument “looks 
like” is half the battle to successfully defeating a legal argument, based on rules of 
logic, instead of rules of law.  Legal argument often requires that the litigator re-
duce the argument to its most basic concepts, revealing simple, ingredients, and a 
basic, logical framework that can then be tested against the rules of philosophical 
logic.  Often complex legal analysis turns on these most simple logical questions; 
questions that have certain answers.  They are questions answered not by the appli-
cation of rules of law, but instead on the application of rules of logic.  Lawyers, 
who arm themselves with knowledge of these rules of logic, have an important tool 
in crafting sound arguments, analyzing the structure of argument, and explaining 
just what is wrong with fallacious legal arguments, such as those suffering from the 
Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent. 
Understanding and employing this and other logical fallacies does not require a 
litigator to devote long hours to reading philosophy.  Instead, by mastering certain 
rules of logic and looking for certain patterns of argument, a lawyer can identify a 
logically invalid argument form.  Recognizing even one of these hallmarks of 
 ________________________  
 89. Gilliam, 488 F.3d at 1197 n.7; Stewart Foods, 64 F.3d 141 at 145 n.3, United Tel. Co, 559 F.2d 720 at 
725-26; Topliff v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20533 (N.D.N.Y 2007); Adams v. La.-Pacific 
Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d 331, 338 n.7 (W.D.N.C. 2003), rev’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 177 Fed. App’x. 
335, (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Balcarczyk, 52 M.J. 809, 812 n. 4 (NM.Ct. Crim. App. 2000); In re Jeffery, 
2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7976, n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Pirtle v. Cook, 956 S.W.2d 235, 248 (Mo. 1997), 
City of Green Ridge, 25 S.W. 3d at 563 and 564 n.2; Paulson, 28 S.W. 3d at 572, Culton v. State, 95 S.W. 3d 401, 
405 (Tex. App. 2002). 
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invalid argument will allow a lawyer to identify patterns of argument that might 
seem logically sound, but are in fact, logically unreliable.  Once identified, a law-
yer can use legal precedent, which has rejected logically fallacious arguments like 
the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent, to rebut their opposition’s argument and 
educate the court regarding the place of formal logic in jurisprudence.  A little un-
derstanding of formal logic is all that is required to make one’s opponent’s logic 
(or lack thereof) conspicuous again.  Once an argument can be revealed as logically 
fallacious, its opponent is armed with a powerful advocacy tool. 
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